The ExecuComp compensation database is commonly used in empirical research. We document, however, that when firms and executives are added to the database there is systematic backfilling. The nature of the backfilling process can lead to over-sampling of certain types of firms and managers, generating a data-conditioning bias. We identify which observations were backfilled and find that backfilled data differ along important dimensions, ranging from firm performance to the level and structure of manager compensation. We highlight several relations in which failure to account for backfilling can significantly impact inference. We offer methods to control for backfilling in future research.
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Introduction
Executive compensation, particularly CEO compensation, has been a central focus of shareholders, governmental officials, the media, the public, and academicians for many years. In particular, compensation issues have been subject to intense scrutiny by academics due to the central role of contracting in agency theory. 1 The SEC has required corporations to disclose details on executive compensation since 1934, but much of the increased focus on compensation research since the early 1990s can generally be attributed to increased data availability, and specifically to the introduction of the Standard & Poor's (S&P's) Compustat ExecuComp database (henceforth, ExecuComp) in 1994.
As of October 2012, ExecuComp contained detailed data on executive compensation for 3,316 firms and 192,027 executive-year observations.
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These data include items such as salary, bonus, and stock and option grants for a small group of the highest paid executives within the firm (typically the top five earners as disclosed in firms' proxy statements). Users of the database include companies and their consultants who are interested in benchmarking the compensation of their executives, the media (e.g., BusinessWeek) who are interested in reporting on levels and changes in executive compensation, and academics interested in studying contracting issues.
Given the large number of academic studies that have used ExecuComp and the likelihood that it will continue to be an important source of data in future research, it is imperative to understand how the database is constructed, as well as the nature of any biases induced by the this construction -and, ideally, solutions for any such biases. Using 12 "vintages" of ExecuComp data over the period in which backfilling was pervasive (fiscal years 1994 through 2005), we provide evidence that a backfilling bias exists due to the addition of historical data when coverage on new firms or managers is initiated. Backfilling can be advantageous to 1 See Murphy (1998; 2012) for details on the history of public and academic interest in executive compensation. 2 Less detailed compensation data are available for a wider set of executives. For instance, salary is available for 219,156 executive-years in the October 2012 vintage of ExecuComp. 3 We examine separate vintages of ExecuComp for each year over the period [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . These provide overlapping coverage of compensation data for fiscal years [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . We also include a later vintage (2009) to ensure that we have a sufficiently populated dataset with which to identify backfilling of fiscal year 2005 data.
2 practitioners and the media because of the increased data and its easy accessibility. Similarly, having a larger set of firms with historical information available can potentially increase the power of a researcher's tests. However, for the researcher interested in estimating relations between variables, backfilling introduces a data-conditioning bias that, if unaddressed, has the potential to significantly alter inferences from empirical analyses.
There are three circumstances that prompt backfilling in ExecuComp. Specifically, compensation data from previous years are added to the database whenever: 1) an individual employed at the firm becomes one of the five highest-paid executives in the firm (e.g., gets promoted), 2) a firm is added to the S&P 1500 index, or 3) an S&P client requests that a firm be included in the database. Prior to 2006, when any of these three events occurred, S&P used firms' proxy statements to backfill the available compensation data for all executives (or firmexecutive observations). According to S&P, this practice was discontinued in 2006 due to new regulatory reporting requirements that limit the amount of historical data disclosed in firm proxy Similarly, of the 116,525 manager-year observations with data on option compensation, we estimate that 15,164 (13%) have been backfilled. The amount of backfilled data suggests that there is considerable potential to materially affect empirical findings, particularly if backfilling occurs in a systematic manner.
Indeed, the three events that lead S&P to backfill do not occur randomly. For example, an index addition (a firm being added to the S&P 1500) is likely to follow a period of strong firm performance and high stock returns. Once the firm becomes an index constituent, S&P adds compensation data from the two previous years. In this way, the backfilling process is likely to oversample compensation data from highly successful firms. One can imagine how including 3 these data may lead to biased estimates of, for example, pay-for-performance sensitivities.
In general, we find that backfilling leads to oversampling of firms that tend to be high growth companies with high average performance, but low variance of performance. In addition, the managers for these backfilled observations tend to have lower salaries but high stock ownership. We find that failure to control for backfilling generates an upward bias in the magnitudes of several previously established relations. For example, after excluding data that we estimate to have been backfilled, we find that a CEO at the median-risk firm receives $0.55 in total direct compensation per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. However, using all available ExecuComp data (including observations we estimate to have been backfilled), we find a sensitivity of $0.69 per $1,000, an increase of 25%. The upward bias in the estimate that uses all ExecuComp data is driven by backfilling -the sensitivity estimated using only backfilled data is $2.95 per $1,000, over five times higher than the sensitivity measured using non-backfilled data.
The effects of backfilled data are more dramatic if we incorporate stock and option compensation in our estimates of pay-for-performance sensitivities (PPS). Failure to account of backfilled data generates a PPS estimate that is 64% higher than the PPS we find using backfillfree data ($1.75 using backfill-free data versus $2.87 using all of ExecuComp). Given the prevalence of studies comparing pay-for-performance sensitivities based on ExecuComp data to Jensen and Murphy's (1990) findings, our results suggest that more recent PPS sensitivities are overestimated. 5 We find similar effects from backfilling on the estimation of several other previously identified relations. For example, failure to control for backfilling leads to an over-estimation of the relation between the pay-performance sensitivities and firm risk, and the relation between managerial ownership and firm value. These examples highlight the importance of controlling for backfilled data in future research. In the next section, we describe the data, the method we use to identify backfilled observations, and the way in which we distinguish the cause of backfilling for each affected observation. In the third section, we show how backfilled observations differ from nonbackfilled observations in terms of firm and manager characteristics. Using these differences as motivation, we select a few previously established compensation relations in which backfilling is likely to impact estimation. We replicate these studies and control for backfilling in Section 4.
We conclude by discussing ways in which researchers can adjust for backfilling using readily available data.
Data and potential biases
In this section, we describe how S&P constructs the ExecuComp database and the nature of the biases.
ExecuComp construction and the backfilling process
S&P collects executive compensation data from firms' annual proxy statements (form DEF 14A). Prior to the implementation of FAS123 in 2006, firms were required to report current compensation data along with two years of historical data for the five most highly-compensated executives (often referred to as the "Top 5").
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However, with the passage of FAS123, firms are required to disclose only the current year's compensation data, and so according to S&P the general policy of backfilling data ended in 2006. 8 Firms report salary, bonus, options (and a Black-Scholes estimate of the value thereof), restricted stock, long-term compensation, and other pay, as well as measures of aggregate compensation, including total direct compensation (TDC1), computed as the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other pay. 7 Firms may choose to report data on more than the top five in which case S&P collects data on up to nine executives, including executives who would have been in the top five had they still been in place at the end of the year. In addition, the pre-2006 rules allowed firms to not disclose compensation for executives other than the CEO if their total salary and bonus were less than $200,000. However, such exceptions are rare in the data. 8 We find evidence of limited backfilling post-2006. 5 S&P collects these compensation data for executives for a large group of firms, the selection of which is based largely, but not entirely, on membership in the S&P 1500 index. That is, ExecuComp covers all firms in the S&P 1500 index, and even if a firm drops out of the index, S&P continues to collect compensation data. In addition to these index firms, S&P periodically collects data for specific firms at the request of their clients, and these data are subsequently added to the database. Thus, a number of other firms included in ExecuComp are not and have never been in the S&P 1500 index. Of the 22,720 firm-year observations with fiscal year in 1994-2005 database, 17,422 (76.7%) were members of the S&P 1500 index at the time of the observation. Out of the 5,298 remaining firm-years, 1,261 (5.6% of the total) are firms that were previously in the index. We conclude that the remaining 4,037 firm-year observations (17.8% of the total) have been added to the database at the request of S&P clients (and represent firms that were not members of the S&P 1500).
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The executives covered in the ExecuComp database also change over time. These changes can occur because new firms are added (either to the S&P 1500 or a by way of a client request) or because a new individual becomes one of the five highest-paid executives in the firm. When any of these events occur over the 1994-2005 timeframe, historical compensation data would be added to ExecuComp if it were available.
The specifics for such additions are as follows. If a new firm is added to the S&P 1500 in year t, then S&P would collect all option and summary compensation variables for year t, and backfill data from previous years depending upon how long each manager had been in the topfive group: i) if the manager was in the top five in t-1 and t-2, then all option and summary compensation data are backfilled for these years; ii) if the manager was not in the top five in t-1 and t-2, then S&P would backfill only summary compensation items for these years. If a client requests that a firm be added to the database, the backfilling would depend in part on the client 6 request and in part on data availability. If a new individual enters the set of top-five executives for which compensation is disclosed in year t, S&P would collect all option and summary compensation data for year t, and backfill only summary compensation variables for years t-1 and t-2. Figure 1 illustrates how backfilling can affect analyses based on firm characteristics -in this example, stock performance. For each firm-year in ExecuComp for the 1994-2005 period, we collect stock returns over the years t, t+1, and t+2. We do this separately for the full sample and five sub-samples of firms. We create the following subsamples: 1) firms-years in which, according to our estimation, no managers have backfilled compensation data 2) at least one manager for any reason has backfilled data, 3) at least one manager has backfilled data due to manager addition (e.g., due to promotion), 4) the firm was backfilled because it was added to the S&P index (thus all managers were backfilled), and 5) the firm was backfilled because of an S&P client request. Samples 3, 4, and 5 are subsets of sample 2. Samples 4 and 5 differ from the others in that a new firm is added to ExecuComp, and so both firm characteristics and manager characteristics are backfilled. These firm additions typically result in backfilling of up to three years of stock returns.
The nature of potential biases
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
As can be seen from Figure 1 , there are substantial differences in mean cumulative returns across the different samples. Backfilled observations have higher average returns than the nonbackfilled sample. The distinction between manager additions, index additions, and client requests shows that this performance difference is driven by backfilling resulting from index additions and client requests. This figure sheds light on how the backfilling procedure can result in oversampling of successful, high-growth firms. In contrast, observations that were backfilled due to manager additions have almost identical average returns to those of non-backfilled observations. This is not surprising as such additions do not result in new firms and their returns being added to the database. [Insert Figure 2 here.]
In a similar manner, Figure 3 shows median pay-for-performance sensitivities (PPS) for each year from 1994 through 2005 for three different samples. As in Figure 2 , the first chart summarizes the full sample, the second chart focuses on data that was not backfilled, and the third reports PPS only for backfilled observations. Following Murphy (1999), we measure PPS separately for options, stock, cash compensation and long term incentive payouts.
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The bar height represents the median total change in CEO wealth per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. The contribution of individual sources of pay to the total PPS is computed by first measuring the percentage of PPS that comes from each source for each CEO, then averaging across all CEOs in that cross section. As the chart suggests, the pay-for-performance sensitivity for the median CEO has varied substantially across time. The chart also shows that backfilled firms appear to have very different pay-for-performance sensitivities relative to non-backfilled firms. In an average year, the median non-backfilled CEO has total PPS of $6.6 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Among backfilled CEO's this sensitivity is $13.6 per $1,000. The composition of this pay-for-performance sensitivity also differs. Relative to the non-backfilled 10 Specifically, option sensitivity is measured as the number of options owned scaled by shares outstanding multiplied by the option delta. Stock sensitivity is measured similarly but with delta set to one. The sensitivity of cash compensation is measured by first regressing the change in log cash compensation on the change in log shareholder value in each cross section, where cash compensation is salary, bonus, and other compensation. Then this elasticity is multiplied by the CEO's cash compensation scaled by the market equity value of the firm to convert into a firm-level cash compensation sensitivity. LTIP sensitivity is LTIP divided by the change in shareholder wealth over the prior three years. To avoid negative sensitivities, we set them equal to zero whenever shareholder returns are less than 5% annually over the period. All sensitivities are converted to reflect dollar change in CEO wealth for a $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. See Murphy (1999) for a detailed discussion of the construction of these sensitivities, and the associated assumptions. 8 sample, a larger portion of backfilled CEO's PPS estimates stems from changes in option, restricted stock, and stock values.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
These initial finding suggest that backfilling, and the resulting systematic oversampling of certain types of firms and managers, generates the potential to make incorrect inferences or misleading estimates. Moreover, failing to control for backfilling may lead to a lack of comparability of results across studies, depending on the exact methodology and the specific vintage of ExecuComp data used.
Identifying backfilled observations
ExecuComp releases several versions of the database each year as they update data based on firms' annual proxy statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Proxy statements must be filed within 120 days of the firm's fiscal year end, and most firms have a fiscal year end of December 31. However, because not all firms have fiscal year-end dates in December, S&P releases ExecuComp in April of each year, and then provides updates throughout the year, usually in May, June, and October. Naturally, the October vintage of a particular year's ExecuComp database is the most complete. The approach we take to identify backfilled data is to examine several vintages of ExecuComp and then use overlapping periods of coverage to back out the vintage in which each observation first appears.
We use October releases of the ExecuComp database for each year from 1996 through 2006, with the exception of 2002, for which we have a June release. Our strategy for identifying backfilled observations considers the delay in data being entered into the system. That is, we allow for the maximum 120-day period after fiscal year end that firms have to file their proxies and an additional two-month processing time for proxy data to be added to the database.
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To ensure conservative estimation of backfilling, and to allow for uncertainty in intra-month timing, 9 we add an additional month and allow a full seven months from the firm's fiscal year-end before we expect the data to be in the database.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Our eleven vintages are summarized in Table 1 ExecuComp, but appear in October 1997 or a later vintage, then that observation is identified as backfilled. We repeat this process for each subsequent yearly edition of ExecuComp, always excluding the seven months prior to that vintage's release date. To identify backfilled data, we do this for each manager-year observation twice, once using the Salary variable, and again using the TDC1 variable. In doing so, we identify whether an observation has been backfilled, the type of compensation data that was backfilled, and the year in which the backfilling took place.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
In Table 2 1998. We estimate that 3,923 (31%) of these were backfilled at some point. Thus, a paper using the 2009 ExecuComp database to examine 1998 compensation will have a very different sample relative to that of an earlier paper that used, for example, the 1999 vintage.
We find that most backfilling of data for a given year occurs within the first few years after For the remainder of the paper, we maintain two approaches in our tests. First, we focus on the 1994-2005 sample period, which is the period over which most backfilling occurred.
12
This period spans the years for which ExecuComp was first made available up to the point in time in which S&P changed their backfilling in response to the SEC's 2006 revised compensation disclosure requirements. Second, for each test, we select the appropriate backfilling identifier 11 based on the data required. As noted above, differences arise because, while each manager-year observation in ExecuComp has summary compensation data available, not every observation has the more detailed compensation data on items such as option grants. If a test uses only summary compensation data, we use Back_Salary as the identifier. If a test uses detailed data on the components of compensation -such as option data needed to calculate pay-for-performance sensitivities -then we use Back_TDC1 to identify backfilled observations.
Identifying the reasons for backfilling
The potential biases introduced by backfilling will likely depend on the manner in which observations are backfilled. We distinguish between the three types of backfilling: client request (Client), index-firm addition (Index) and manager entry into the group of highly paid managers within a firm currently in the database (Manager). Details of the strategy we employ to estimate the types of backfilling are reported in the Appendix. In brief, we use two pieces of information: the timing of the backfilling and the historical S&P 1500 constituents list. If the backfilling occurs more than two years prior to the firm entering the S&P 1500, then it must be clientrequest backfilled. If the observation occurs one or two years prior to index addition, then it is index-level backfilling. If an observation is backfilled and the firm is currently in the S&P 1500, or if there are other observations for the same firm-year that are not backfilled, then it must be manager backfilling. We use indicator variables Back_Salary_Client, Back_Salary_Index and Back_Salary_Manager to indicate client, index, and manager backfilling for observations in which the Salary variable is backfilled.
Similarly, we construct indicator variables Back_Total_Client, Back_Total_Index and Back_Total_Manager, for the TDC1 backfilled data.
Last, in several analyses we report results that distinguish firm-level backfilling from managerlevel backfilling. In these cases, firm-level backfilling is the union of Index and Client backfilling.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
The results of this identification process are shown in 3 Differences in backfilled data
Univariate analysis
In this section we describe how backfilled data differ from the non-backfilled observations.
We expect differences because of the systematic way in which these observations are added to the database. As a result, in addition to distinguishing backfilled from non-backfilled data, we also make the distinction between the types of backfilling. Summary statistics for the different samples are reported in Table 4 . We report means and medians of measures of compensation and firm characteristics taken from CRSP, Compustat, and ExecuComp. The first column shows means and medians for the full sample. The second and third columns use non-backfilled and backfilled data, respectively. The remaining columns divide the backfilled sample by the type of backfilling. Specifically, the fourth column shows backfilling that occurs when a firm is added to the database (Firm), either because of index addition or client request. The fifth and sixth columns divide this further into the Index addition and Client request categories. The seventh column shows the mean and median statistics for the backfilling due to Manager additions to the database. For each of the columns three through seven, we present t-tests for differences in means where standard errors are clustered by firm, and Wilcoxon's z-scores for differences in medians. All differences are measured relative to the non-backfilled sample (Column 2).
[Insert Table 4 here.]
The first three columns in Table 4 show that, on almost every dimension considered in the table, the backfilled firms differ significantly from the non-backfilled observations, both economically and statistically. These results are consistent with Figures 1, 2, and 3, which graphically presented differences in returns, the level of compensation, and pay-for-performance sensitivities.
Relative to observations that were not backfilled, backfilled observations have much lower values for compensation components, e.g., salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, and option grant value, but higher fractional ownership. The mean (median) salary among backfilled manager observations is $244,000 ($208,000), compared to $375,000 ($304,000) among the nonbackfilled observations. The mean (median) total compensation, summarized by TDC1, is $1,183,000 ($518,000) among backfilled observations. This is roughly half the total compensation among the non-backfilled manager observations, $2,257,000 ($988,000). These differences, statistically significant at the 1% level, suggest that using later vintages of ExecuComp without adjusting for backfilling would lead to estimates of compensation that are biased downward relative to estimates based on the original data.
We also compute option-grant pay-for-performance sensitivity as in Yermack (1995) and find a mean sensitivity of $2.36 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth for the backfilled observations compared to $0.85 for the non-backfilled sample, indicating that the backfilled observations have substantially greater option PPS than do the original observations.
In contrast to Panel A, in Panel B the unit of analysis is a firm-year observation. We determine a firm-level observation to be backfilled (column three) if any executive in that firmyear was backfilled for any reason. Identification of client and index types of backfilling is straightforward as these are firm-level identifiers (columns four through six). We determine a firm to be a manager addition if there are backfilled data for any manager in that firm year due to a manager addition (column seven).
Focusing on column four, which reports summary statistics for firm-level backfilling (index additions and client requests), we find that these backfilled firms tend to be smaller, with lower dividend yields, lower leverage, and higher growth. There are notable differences in stock returns as well. These backfilled firms tend to have substantially higher mean subsequent stock performance (i.e., after the date of the observation), but lower variance in returns relative to 14 firms that were not backfilled. These differences between backfilled and non-backfilled observations are statistically and economically significant.
Multivariate analysis
In order to better understand the differences in characteristics between backfilled and nonbackfilled observations, we model the likelihoods that i) a firm-year is backfilled (Table 5) and ii) a firm-manager-year observation is backfilled (Table 6 ). Our empirical specifications include variables that have been identified in prior work as being important in explaining the variation in compensation across firms.
14 To compare the magnitudes of the models' coefficients, we standardize the independent variables to have mean zero and unit variance and report the odds ratios from the logit models.
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[Insert Table 5 here.]
In Table 5 , given that we focus on the firm level, we are effectively modeling the likelihood that a firm is backfilled. In column one, the dependent variable takes a value of one if the firm was backfilled (due to index addition or client request). In columns two and three, we separate the firm-level backfilling into Index additions and Client requests, respectively. In columns four and five, we report the results for an indicator of whether a firm in a given year has any manager backfilling identified using total compensation or salary data. Specifically, in column four, the dependent variable takes a value of one if any manager within that firm and year has Back_TDC1 equal to one. The last column uses a dependent variable that equals one if any manager within that firm and year has Back_Salary equal to one. Table 5 shows that backfilled firms generally have higher Tobin's q , higher stock returns and lower variance of returns. From column one, a firm with q one standard deviation above the mean is 1.2 times more likely to be backfilled than a firm with average q. A firm with a one standard deviation higher variance (given by CDF(σ 2 ret )) is half as likely to be backfilled relative to the firm with average variance. Consistent with prior univariate results, backfilled firms also 14 For example, see Hartzell and Starks (2003) . 15 The specifications include year indicators. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
tend to have higher subsequent returns. For example, a firm with a stock return over t+1 that is one standard deviation above the mean is 1.39 times more likely to be backfilled.
In a similar manner, Table 6 focuses on executive-year observations and reports the odds ratios from logit models where the dependent variable takes the value of one if the observation is backfilled and zero otherwise. These specifications focus in more depth on compensation measures by including as explanatory variables details of the executive's compensation structure, including bonus, stock grants, the Black-Scholes value of option grants, and pay-for-performance sensitivity of option grants (as defined in Yermack (1995)). We also include executive ownership, an indicator variable for whether or not the executive is CEO (as identified by the CEOANN variable in ExecuComp) and firm characteristics. We examine the set of all backfilled observations in column one, all firm-level backfilling in column two, and the two types of firmlevel backfilling in columns three and four (Index additions and Client requests). In addition, we provide a separate analysis based on Manager backfilling in column five using TDC1 as the backfill identifier. The sixth column identifies backfilling through use of the Salary data as opposed to TDC1.
[Insert Table 6 here.]
Consistent with the univariate analysis, salary is significantly lower for the backfilled observations as shown in columns one and six. However, columns two through five show that this is driven by manager-level backfilling. Backfilled observations tend to have larger stock grants, although the economic magnitude of the effect is low. We also see that backfilling appears to be associated with higher pay-for-performance sensitivity, backfilled executives tend to hold a higher percentage of the firm's shares, and that CEOs are less likely to be backfilled. Given the systematic way in which observations are selected for backfilling, and the resulting large differences in the levels and components of compensation, subsequent returns, and other firm characteristics, it is likely that using ExecuComp data in empirical tests may lead to biased estimates. To highlight the potential effects of backfilling, we replicate several common tests used in the corporate finance literature.
The level of compensation
Much research has been dedicated to explaining the level of executive pay. For example, several papers provide theoretical and empirical evidence that compensation is related to firm size (e.g., Murphy (1985) , Baker and Hall (1998), Murphy and Zábojník (2004) and Gabaix and
Landier (2008)). Given the differences in firm size and executive compensation between backfilled and non-backfilled observations shown in the previous section, it is likely that backfilling might impact the estimated relations between these variables.
Similarly, other studies combine compensation data with size and additional firm characteristics in order to construct estimates of abnormal pay (e.g., Smith and Watts (1992) 
16
[Insert Table 7 here.] Table 7 shows the results of computing abnormal compensation for both our full sample (column one) and the non-backfilled sample (column two). Below the regression output we summarize both the fitted values and error terms from each respective regression -i.e., normal and abnormal compensation. We see significant differences in both normal and abnormal compensation across the backfilled and non-backfilled observations. On average, expected or normal TDC1 is $1,765,000 for the full sample, but only $902,000 for backfilled observations.
The average error term is zero by construction for the full sample, but when splitting the sample by Back_Total, we see that backfilled observations have negative prediction errors on average, and non-backfilled data have positive errors. The difference between the two is highly statistically significant (t-statistic of 4.86). This suggests that the inclusion of backfilled data leads to upwardly biased estimates of abnormal compensation for the non-backfilled observations on average.
The effect of including backfilled data is an increase in abnormal compensation of roughly 20 thousand on average, a relatively moderate effect. However, for any given executive, the 18 effect can be large. For example, John Menzer, an executive at Wal-Mart, had compensation in 2003 that is $402,000 higher than the predicted value -when forming predictions using all of ExecuComp. After excluding backfilled data, his compensation is actually lower than the predicted value by $49,000.
Pay-for-Performance sensitivity
We examine estimates of pay-for-performance sensitivity, first by estimating the relation between changes in executive wealth and changes in shareholder wealth in the spirit of Jensen and Murphy (1990) . Given the previously documented differences in firm performance and executive compensation across the backfilled and non-backfilled samples, this pay-forperformance analysis is a natural place to examine the potential effects of backfilling.
Additionally, given the significant differences in the variance of firm's returns across the samples, we examine the impact of backfilling on the conditional relation between executives' pay for performance and firm risk.
We focus on two measures of executive compensation when estimating pay-forperformance sensitivities. The first dependent variable we use is total direct compensation,
TDC1.
The second measure includes total direct compensation plus stock and option ownership and is defined as TDC1 + Δ(value of shares and options owned). The change in the value of shares equals the share price times the number of shares owned multiplied by the stock return.
Similarly, the change in value of options owned is estimated as the sum across all options in the manager's portfolio of the Black-Scholes value of the option times an estimate of the option delta multiplied by the stock return.
When estimating pay-for-performance sensitivities we also condition on firm risk.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) find that executive pay is less sensitive to firm performance when firm performance is highly volatile. We follow the approach of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and test whether pay-for-performance sensitivity is decreasing in the cumulative distribution function of variance of firm returns, CDF(σ 2 ret ), which equals the firm's percentile of return variation among all firms in the sample. Values of zero and one correspond to firms with the minimum and maximum dollar return variation, respectively.
In order to estimate pay-for-performance sensitivities, we regress one of our two measures of the change in CEO wealth (measured in thousands) on contemporaneous and lagged changes in shareholder wealth (measured in millions). We test the conditional relation with firm risk using an interaction term. We further condition all of these relations on backfilling by interacting each variable with an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the observation is backfilled. Specifically, we estimate the following regression using an OLS framework with executive and time fixed effects: Back_Total_Manager, indicating all backfilling, and client, index, and manager backfilling for observations in which the TDC1 variable is backfilled. The primary independent variable in our regression, the change in shareholder wealth, is computed as market equity measured at the beginning of the firm's fiscal year multiplied by the firm's real return over the year (the stock return minus the percentage change in the consumer price index, or CPI). The results are shown in Table 8 .
[Insert Table 8 here.]
The first three columns use TDC1 to measure the change in CEO wealth, and columns four through six add to TDC1 wealth changes due to stock and option ownership. Columns two, three, five and six include backfilling indicator variables to test for marginal effects of backfilling on the estimation. In column one, we do not make the distinction between backfilled and non-20 backfilled data. We find that a CEO at the median-risk firm receives $0.69 = 1.40-0.5*1.42 in total direct compensation for every $1,000 generated for shareholders (ignoring the lagged effects of performance on pay). This is the estimate that would be obtained by a researcher unaware of backfilling. In column two, we distinguish between backfilled and non-backfilled data using interactions with a backfill indicator variable. We find that using a sample of ExecuComp that excludes backfilled data results in a pay sensitivity estimate of $0.55 = 1.12 -0.5*1.14. Therefore, including backfilled data generates a PPS estimate that is 25% higher than what would be found using a backfill-free sample. As this implies, we find that among backfilled observations, the PPS estimate is statistically significantly higher, at $2.95 = 0.55 + 4.09 -0.5*3.38. In column three, we find that the most of the backfilling effect is driven by client backfilling.
We find a larger impact of backfilling on estimates that include wealth effects due to stock and option ownership. In the full sample, PPS for the median firm is estimated to be $2.87 = 5.83 -0.5*5.93 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth (column four). From column five, we see that for non-backfilled data the median-firm PPS is estimated as $1.75 = 3.55 -0.5*3.61.
Therefore, the inclusion of backfilled data generates a PPS estimate that is 64% higher than what one would estimate among a non-backfilled sample of ExecuComp data. These findings suggest that, whether one measures wealth using TDC1 alone, or TDC1 plus changes in the value of stock and option ownership, failure to account for backfilling may lead to estimates of pay-forperformance sensitivities that are significantly biased upwards.
We also test for backfilling-induced biases when estimating the relation between pay-forperformance sensitivity and firm risk. The coefficient in column one on Δ t Shareholder wealth * CDF(σ 2 ret ) indicates that the pay sensitivity at the maximum variance firm is lower by $1.42 per $1,000 relative to the sensitivity at the minimum variance firm. This is the estimate that results from using all backfilled and non-backfilled data in ExecuComp. After excluding backfilled data we estimate this spread in pay sensitivity to be $1.14. This indicates that the inclusion of backfilled data generates an estimate of the conditional effect of firm variance that is 25% higher 21 than what one would obtain using backfill-free data. These differences are more dramatic once the value of stock and option ownership is included in the CEO wealth calculation. The coefficient on CDF(σ 2 ret ) *(ΔShareholder wealth) t is -3.61 when estimated using backfill-free data (column five) compared to -5.93 when including backfilled data (column four). In this case, failure to account for backfilling leads to overstating the conditional effect of firm risk on PPS estimates by 64%.
Firm Value and Managerial Ownership
As shown in Tables 4, 5 , and 6, backfilling is strongly associated with both managerial ownership (as a percentage of the firm) and Tobin's q. In light of this, we estimate the impact of using backfilled data to estimate relations between firm value and managerial ownership as in Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) [HHP] . To do so, we regress Tobin's q on total managerial ownership as a percent of shares outstanding and other firm-level variables.
Because this test uses firm-level observations, we redefine the backfilling dummy as one if any manager observation within that firm-year is backfilled, and zero otherwise. We interact this backfilling indicator variable with various measures of firm ownership in a manner consistent with HHP.
[Insert Table 9 here.] Specifically, we test two different functional forms of the relationship between ownership and firm value. We include squared ownership in columns one through four, nine, and 10 as an additional independent variable, and in columns five through eight, 11 and 12, we employ a spline specification. All regressions include year fixed effects and the last four columns include firm fixed effects. The first column shows a positive and significant association between Tobin's q and managerial ownership, m. A 10% increase in managerial ownership is associated with a 0.21 increase in q. In the second column, we include indicator variables for backfilled data. The coefficient on ownership is no longer statistically significant when conditioning on backfilled data. The relation between ownership and q among backfilled data is positive and significant (and significantly concave).
Examination of the remaining columns suggests that the effect of backfilling is not quite as straightforward as is suggested by the first two columns. The impact of backfilling depends on the presence of controls for firm characteristic and the specification of the functional form of the relation between ownership and q. For example, column nine includes firm effects and additional control variables. The coefficient on ownership is 2.13, and while this again drops after controlling for backfilling in column 10 (to 1.28), it remains statistically significant. As in the other columns, in these specifications, concavity in the ownership-q relation is driven by backfilled data.
The spline specification offers similar results. Conditioning on backfilling either renders the relation insignificant (column five versus six), or alters the magnitude of the effect and its functional form (columns 11 and 12). Overall, the results indicate that including backfilled data when examining the association between Tobin's q and ownership is likely to lead to an economically and statistically different estimate of the magnitude of the effect and perhaps even the correct functional form.
Identifying Backfilling with Readily Available Data
In the previous sections, we have shown that including backfilled data in the sample can produce meaningful differences in estimated coefficients and consequently, the interpretation of results. One solution is to use the data we make available for research purposes. These include the identification of backfilled observations, when we estimate the observation was backfilled (useful for purposes of replication), and why we think the observation was backfilled. A drawback of this dataset is that it only applies to 1994-2005. While the magnitude of backfilling has dropped post-2005, it appears not to have stopped completely. In this section, we suggest a few screens could reasonably be applied to any time period.
Researchers can remove a significant portion of backfilled data using information in current If the sample is further restricted to executives at firms that were either in the S&P 1500 during that fiscal year in which the compensation data apply or were in the S&P 1500 prior to that fiscal year, then 100% of client and 100% index backfilling is removed. In addition to removing backfilled data, this screen also removes executives at firms whose inclusion in
ExecuComp was initiated by a client request. Specifically, this removes 16,809 observations, 53% of which are backfilled, reducing the final sample to 99,716. Of the remaining 99,716
observations, only 6% of Salary observations and 6% of TDC1 observations are backfilled -all due to manager additions. This can be compared to the unconditional probability that a Salary (TDC1) observation is backfilled, 23% (13%).
To better understand the validity of this screening procedure, we examine the mean manager and firm characteristics for the different subsamples. In columns one and two of Table 10 we report sample means for non-backfilled and backfilled samples, respectively, as identified by the screening process discussed in this section. Column one reports mean characteristics of manager-year observations in which both Salary and TDC1 are available, and the firm is currently in the S&P1500 or was included in the index previously. Column two reports means for observations in which either TDC1 is missing or the firm is not and has never been in the S&P1500. This distinction between estimating which data are non-backfilled and backfilled can be compared to results we obtain when making the distinction using the 11 overlapping vintages of ExecuComp (columns three and four). Column five reports statistical significance of the difference between data estimated to be non-backfilled using screens, versus data determined to 24 be non-backfilled using the 11 vintages.
Results indicate that the screening procedure does a reasonable job of obtaining a sample that is representative of non-backfilled observations. The screening sufficiently controls for differences in salary and ownership, firm size, and to some extent, future firm returns. It is not perfect as indicated by some differences that remain. Encouragingly though, results suggest that these screens using readily available data do a reasonably good job of capturing many of the biases in firm and manager characteristics that result from backfilling. Perhaps most importantly, even the remaining statistically significant differences are much smaller in economic magnitude compared to the uncorrected differences.
Conclusion
Standard and Poor's has often backfilled compensation data when compiling its ExecuComp database. There are three events that can lead to backfilling: a firm enters the S&P1500, a manager enters the top five managers within the firm (in terms of compensation levels), or a client of S&P requests that historical information be added to the dataset. Because this backfilling process is non-random, it is perhaps not surprising that these data differ significantly from the non-backfilled data along several dimensions. For example, backfilled observations tend to be executives at firms with high stock returns and low return volatility. These executives have low salary and high option compensation relative to non-backfilled data. Thus, while the additional data can be helpful for some purposes, we demonstrate that using the full dataset can be problematic for others.
After examining several compensation-based relations that have been of interest among researchers in financial economics, we find that using the backfilled data can bias estimates. For example, we find a pay-for-performance sensitivity estimate among backfilled data that is several times higher than the sensitivity among non-backfilled data. To assist researchers in avoiding these issues going forward, we identify a set of screens that rely only on readily available data designed to identify observations that are likely backfilled.
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Beyond the effects of backfilling on compensation research, it is important to recognize the issue for other studies whose central focus is on variables other than compensation, but who use ExecuComp pay data as controls in their analyses. Although we have not examined these types of studies, they also will be subject to the effects of the ex-post conditioning bias including potential misrepresentation of relations.
Appendix -Identifying types of backfilling
If the executive-year observation is backfilled, then:
Client-level:
 If the firm is not currently (as of 2009) in the S&P 1500 and has never been in the index, it is client backfilled.
 If the year of the earliest vintage in which any of that firm's observations were backfilled is less than or equal to the year in which the firm was added to the index AND the year of the observation is before the year in which the firm was added to the index, then it is client backfilled.
Index-level
 If the year of the earliest vintage in which any of that firm's observations were backfilled is one year after the firm was added to the index, it is firm backfilled.
 If the year of the earliest vintage in which any of that firm's observations were backfilled is two years after the firm was added to the index AND all observations in that firm-year were backfilled, then it is firm backfilled.
Manager-level
 If the year of the earliest vintage in which any of that firm's observations were backfilled is at least three years after the firm was added to the index (or exactly two years after and not all of the observations in that firm-year were backfilled), it is manager backfilled.
 If the year the observation was backfilled is after the year of the earliest vintage in which any of that firm's observations were backfilled, it is manager backfilled.
• If the year of the observation is equal to or greater than the year the firm was added to the index, it is manager backfilled.
Figure 1 Cumulative Stock Returns
This figure plots the average cumulative stock returns for firm-year observations in ExecuComp over 1994-2005. The return from 0 to t represents the average stock return measured contemporaneously with that firm's year t compensation data. We also report cumulative stock returns that incorporate years t+1 and t+2. We report returns separately for the full sample, observations that we estimate were not backfilled, backfilled observations, and three subsets of backfilled observations -index, client, and manager. Specifically, a firmlevel observation is backfilled if any manager in that year is backfilled for any reason. A firm is not backfilled if no manager has been backfilled. The manager backfilled sample is any firm with backfilling due to manager additions. Index backfilled sample contains any firm that was backfilled because it was added to the S&P1500 Index. Client backfilled sample contains firms that were added to ExecuComp because of a client request. This table reports Column one reports the total number of observations that we estimate to have been backfilled because the firm entered the S&P 1500 index. Column two reports the total number of observations that we estimate to have been backfilled due to S&P client requests. Column three reports the total number of observations that we estimate to have been backfilled because the manager entered the top five paid managers in the firm. Panel A reports results using Salary as the identifying compensation item, and Panel B uses TDC1.
Fiscal year Index addition Client request Manager addition Table 4 Summary Statistics This table reports means and medians of manager and firm characteristics for fiscal years 1994 through 2005. The first column summarizes the means (with medians below in parentheses) for all manager-year salary observations in the October 2009 vintage. The second column includes all manager-year observations that are not backfilled (using Salary as the identifier), and column three reports statistics on backfilled observations. The last four columns report statistics on subsets of backfilled data. Column four uses firm-level backfilled data, which are observations backfilled either due to index additions or client requests. Columns five through seven decompose backfilling into its three types: index, client and manager. Panel A shows the manager compensation and ownership characteristics from ExecuComp (Salary, Bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock grants, total direct compensation (TDC1), shares owned, and Black-Scholes option values. The panel also shows variables computed as in previous compensation research: Allpay is constructed following Jensen and Murphy (1990) and equals total cash compensation plus the change in the present value of future cash compensation plus the change in option value. Option PFP is the pay-for-performance sensitivity from option grants (dollar change in executive's option value per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth) as defined in Yermack (1995) . Panel B uses firm-level observations and compares firm characteristics obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP. A firm-level observation is considered to be backfilled (Column 3) if any manager is backfilled. Similarly Column 7 is all firms with any manager that was backfilled due to manager addition. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. Div yield is the sum of dividends over the year divided by market equity. q is Tobin's q and CDF(σ 2 ret ) is the cumulative distribution function of the variance of returns for firms in our sample, following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) . Instl Ownership Herfindahl is the Herfindahl index of institutional ownership using holdings from Thompson. ** and * indicate differences at the 1% and 5% level respectively, between the respective column and column two (nonbackfilled data), where differences in means are tested using t-tests with clusters at the firm level, and differences in medians are tested using Wilcoxon rank sum tests.
Table 5 Descriptors of Backfilled Firm-level Data
This table presents odds ratios from Logit specifications using firm-level observations from ExecuComp for 1994 through 2005. The first column uses a dependent variable equal to one if an executive in the firm has TDC1 that has been backfilled for any reason. In column two, the dependent variable equals one if the executives in a given firm have TDC1 backfilled due to either index additions or client requests, and zero otherwise. The third column uses a dependent variable equal to one if TDC1 for any executive at the firm has been backfilled due to index addition, and column four uses a dependent variable equal to one if TDC1 has been backfilled due to client request. The last column identifies a firm as backfilled if any manager has Salary backfilled. Ln(Firm size) is the log of market equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. Div yield is the sum of dividends over the year divided by market equity. q is Tobin's q and CDF(σ 2 ret ) is the cumulative distribution function of the variance of returns for firms in our sample, following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999 This table reports odds ratios from Logit specifications using manager-level observations from ExecuComp for 1994 through 2005. Columns one through five use TDC1 to determine backfilling, and the last column uses Salary. Column one reports odds ratios from a specification in which the dependent variable equals one for any backfilled observation, and zero otherwise. Column two sets the dependent variable equal to one if the observation is either index or client backfilled. Columns three through five use backfilling indicator variables for index, client, and manager backfilling, respectively. Manager compensation and ownership characteristics are obtained directly from ExecuComp (Salary, Bonus, other annual compensation, stock grants, the percentage of shares owned, and Black-Scholes option values). Option PFP is the pay-for-performance sensitivity of options grants as defined in Yermack (1995) . CEO takes the value of one if the CEOANN variable in ExecuComp equals "CEO". Ln(Firm size) is the log of market equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. Div yield is the sum of dividends over the year divided by market equity. q is Tobin's q, CDF(σ 2 ret ) is the cumulative distribution function of the variance of returns for firms in our sample, following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) . If the % shares owned is missing, it is set to zero, and we include a dummy variable equal to one if %shares owned is missing. We do the same for Option PFP. Coefficients on these dummy variables are not reported for brevity. All independent variables are standardized. All specifications include year effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Column one uses all data and column two restricts the sample to non-backfilled observations (Back_Total=0). Tenure is the time in years since the executive started at the firm and is obtained from ExecuComp. Sales is annual sales from Compustat. S&P 500 equals one if the firm is in the S&P500 index, and zero otherwise. BTM is book equity over market equity, ROA is EBIT over assets, RET is firm stock return and CEO is an indicator set to one if the CEOANN variable in ExecuComp equals "CEO". All regressions include year and two-digit SIC effects. Below the regression coefficients we report mean values of the fitted values ("normal" compensation) and residuals ("abnormal" compensation This table reports the results of OLS regressions of pay-for-performance sensitivities, and sensitivities conditional on firm risk using ExecuComp CEO compensation data from 1994 through 2005. CEOs are identified using the CEOANN variable in ExecuComp if available, otherwise the executive with highest total compensation in that firmyear is identified as the CEO. The dependent variable in columns one through three is total direct compensation (TDC1) in thousands of dollars paid over fiscal year t. The dependent variable in columns four through six is TDC1 plus the estimated change in value of shares and options owned by the executive. The change in the value of shares owned is the share price times the number of shares owned multiplied by the stock return over t. The change in value of options is the sum across all options owned of the Black-Scholes value of options times the estimated option delta multiplied by the stock return over t. TDC1 and changes in ownership values are in thousands.
 t Shrwealth is beginning of fiscal year market equity times the firm's real return (stock return minus CPI return) in millions. CDF(σ 2 ret ) is the cumulative distribution function of the variance of returns for firms in our sample, following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999 This table reports estimates of the relation between firm value measured by Tobin's q and managerial ownership, using firm-level observations from 1994 through 2005. All regressions have year effects, and the last four columns also include firm effects. Columns 1-4 and 8-9 use the sum of managerial ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding, m, and squared ownership, m 2 . Columns 5-8 and 11-12 use a spline specification with breakpoints of 5% and 25%, indicated by independent variables m1, m2, and m3. The backfill indicator variable equals one if Back_Salary =1 for any manager in that firm-year. We report results for all regressions both with and without a set of control variables. Controls are ln(Sales), ln(Sales) squared, the ratio of property, plant and equipment (PPE) to Sales, the squared ratio of PPE to Sales, ratio of operating income to Sales, the standard deviation of idiosyncratic stock-price risk and a dummy equal to one if data are available to calculate this standard deviation, the ratio of R&D to PPE and a dummy equal to one if data are available to calculate this ratio, the ratio of advertising expenditures to PPE and a dummy equal to one if data are available to calculate this ratio, and the ratio of capital expenditures to PPE. These controls are included in columns three, four, seven, eight, eleven and twelve. Standard errors are clustered at the firm. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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